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PEOPLE V. CRIMM.

[19 C. (2d)

[3] It is next contended that the record fails to disclose
that the jury was present at all stages of the trial. There
were numerous recesses during the trial. When the court
would reconvene the trial judge would inquire if it was stipulated that the jurors were all present and in their places.
Two or more counsel so stipulated on each occasion. Because appellant's counsel made an audible stipulation on
only three occasions, it is argued that "the record is entirely
silent upon the matter of whether or not the jury ever did
return after any particular recess." Two or more counsel,
however, did stipulate to the presence of the entire jury,
and the entire jury was present at all stages of the proceedings. Nowhere is it charged .that the jury or any part thereof
was absent at any time .when its presence was required.
[4] There is neither error nor prejudice in that part of
the district attorney's closing argument challenged by the
appellant. The prosecuting officer was free to djscuss the
conflict in the two stories related by appellant and to advance any reasonable motive therefor.
[5] The fact that during a recess of court appellant first
related to defense counsel other than his own the story that
he alone had perpetrated the homicide does not require a
reversal. Before the reconvening of the court his own. cOUnsel was likewise so advised. The court upon being informed
of appellant's change of testimony took every precaution to
protect him from pursuing an ill-advised course. The court
admonished the appellant in the following manner: "Now,
you understand, Mr. Crimm, that you are now testifying in
the case where you are accused of the crime of murder, and
if you make any statements, they must be freely and voluntarily; if you give any testimony here, it must be freely and
voluntarily, with the understanding that you are now on
trial for the murder of the deceased in this case. .And anything that you say, of course, would be considered by this
Jury in the matter of determining your innocence, as well
as by the Jury in the event that they find that you are guilty
of the crime of murder in the first degree; it would also be
considered by the jury in determining the amount of punishment that you would receive. Now you have your counsel,
Mr. Artz, who has been appointed by this Court, and you
have been accorded all of the rights that the law provides
for a man charged with crime. I would suggest that you
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be very careful, that you tell the truth, that you be not guided
by anything except the absolute truth, and aside from that,
you are not ·required to testify against yourself unless you
so desire."
In the face of this advice by the court the appellant proceeded to relate the story that implicated him as the sole
perpetrator of the murder. He testified further that he had
no desire to see innocent persons suffer and that his change
of story was entirely voluntary and not the result of fear
or duress. Appellant's counsel cross-examined him with respect to the new story and at no time requested a continuance
to permit further consultation between client and counsel.
At all times appellant had· the advice and assistance of counsel and the circumstances surrounding the revised story in
no way S'lggcsts, as contended, "a denial of due process of
law."
An examination of the entire record reveals nothing in i"!'lS
rulings on the evidence or in the giving or refusing of ill"
structlons that requires a reversal.
The juJgment and order are affirmed.

Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February
26, 1942. Houser, J., did not participate therein.

[So F. No. 16656. In Bank. Jan. 29, 1942.]

MORRIS GREENBERG, Petitioner, V. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[1] Grand Jury-Proceedings-Evidence-E:ffect of Absence of

Evidence.-When a grand jury indicts a person without the
presentation of evidence to connect him with the commission
[1] Quashing indictment for lack of evidence, note, 59 A. L. R.
567. See, also, 27 Am. Jur.719.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Grand Jury, § 28; [2] Prohibition, § 43.
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of the crime charged, it exceeds its authority, and the indict.
me.nt returned is void and ineffectual to confer jurisdiction
upon a court to try a person for the offense charged. (See
Pen. Code, § 921.)
[2] Prohibition - Criminal Proceedings - Grand Jury-Lack of
Evidence.-A writ of prohibition will lie to restrain a, trial
upon an indictment which is void because unsupported by any
evidence be~ore the grand jury, there being no remedy by appeal from orders denying a motion to quash and overruling a
demurrer. The common-law rule of nonimpeachabilityof an
indictment ceased to exist in California with the amendment
of Pen. Code, § 925, so as to require a transcript of testimony
in cases in which an indictment is found. (Brobeck v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. 289, 92 Pac. 646, overruled.)

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court,of the City and County of San Francisco from proceeding with 'a trial. Writ granted.
James C. Purcell and \Villiam E. Ferriter for Petitioner.
Matthew Brady, District Attorney, and John R. Golden,
Assistant District Attorney for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The grand jury of the City and County
of San Francisco returned an indictment charging petitioner
and four others with conspiracy to commit grand theft in violation of Penal Code section 182. The indictment charged
that all of the persons named therein procured from the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company a policy of avtomobile insurance on an automobile that had already been wrecked, that
they then reported to the company that the car was wrecked
at a time after the date of issuance of the insurance, and that
the company paid them for the asserted loss. After petitioner
was arraigned, he moved to quash the indictment on the
ground that it was void and that the court was without jurisdiction to proceed thereon because there was no evidence before the grand jury tending to support the charges made
against him. His motion was denied and he demurred to the
indictment. The court overruled the demurrer and set the
case for trial. Petitioner has no appeal from either the order
of the court refusing to quash the indictment or the overruling of the demurrer, and has therefore petitioned this court
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for a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower court from proceeding with the trial.
The transcript of the testimony upon which the indictment
was based contains no evidence even remotely supporting the
charges made against petitioner. Respondent contends, however, that in California prohibition will not lie to restrain a
court from proceeding with the trial of a petitioner on the
ground that there was no evidence presented to the grand
jury of his guilt of the. offense ch~rged.
Prohibition will issue to restrain an inferior tribunal from
acting in excess of its jurisdiction if there is no plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Code
Civ. Proc., sections 1102, 1103.) Public offenses against
the State of California must, with few exceptions, be prosecuted by indictment or information, and a court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of an offense unless a valid
indictment or information has first been presented. (Cal.
Const., art. I, section 8; Pen. Code, sections 682, 888.) An
information is a written accusation of crime made by a
district attorney, without action by a grand jury, after a
magistrate, at a preliminary hearing, has found sufficient
cause to believe the defendant guilty of a public offense and
has ordered him committed. (Cal. Cunst., art. 1, section 8;
Pen. Code, section 809; see cases cited in 7 Cal. Jur.967,
note 15.) If there is no reasonable or probable cause for the
order of the magistrate the defendant may be discharged on
habeas corpus. (Pen. Code, section 1487; see cases cited in 13
Cal. Jur. 230.) An indictment is "an accusation in writing,
presented by the grand jury to a competent court, charging
a person with a public offense" without the necessity of a
preliminary examination by a magistrate. (Pen. Code, section
917; People 'V. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328 [19 Pac. 161J.)
[1] A grand jury's function is to return an indictment
against a person only when the evidence presented to it indicates that he has committed a public offense. It is no Star
Chamber tribunal empowered to return arbitrary indictments
unsupported by any evidence. On the contrary the necessity
of basing an indictment upon evidence is implicit in section
921 of the Penal Code which provides: "The grand jury
ought to find an indictment when all the evidence before them,
taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would, in
their judgment, warrant a conviction by a trial jury."
19

o. (2d)-1l
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A grand jury that indicts a person when no evidence has
been presented to connect him with the commission of the
crime charged, exceeds the authority conferred upon it by
the Constitution and laws of the State of California, and
encroaches upon the right of a person to be free from prosecution for crime unless there is some rational ground for
assuming the possibility that he is guilty. (People v. Restenblatt, 1 Abb. Pro (N. Y.) 268; People V. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395
[66 N. E. 112]; People V. Buffalo Gravel Corp., 195 N. Y.
Supp. 940; People v. Brickner, 8 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 217 [15
N. Y. Supp. 528] ; People V. Price, 6 N. Y. Cdm. Rep. 141
[2 N. Y. Supp. 414]; Gore V. State, 217 Ala. 68 [114 go.
794J; Sparrenberger v. State, 53 Ala. 481 [25 Am. Rep. 643] ;
People V. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495 [80 N. E. 396, 116 Am. St.
Rep. 621]; see United States v. Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 853;
see 59 A. L. R. 567.) Such an indictment is void and confers
no jurisdiction upon a court to try a person for the offense
charged. (Ibid. ) It has long been settled in most jurisdictions that an indictment is invalid if it is unsupported by
any evidence before the grand jury. (See cases collected in
59 A. L. R. 567.) If there is some evidence to support the
indictment, the courts will not inquire into its sufficiency (see
cases collected in 59 A. L. R. 573), but the lack of any evidence conclusively establishes that the grand jury has exceeded its authority in returning an indictment.
[2] At common law an indictment returned by a grand
jury was unimpeachable" because the grand jury proceedings
were clothed in secrecy and a court had no access to the evidence upon which the indictment was based. (People v.
Tinder, 19 Cal. 539 [51 Am. Dec. 77].) There ceased to be
any reason for the common law rule in this state, however,
when section 925 of the Penal Code was amended to require
that a transcript, available to both defendant and prosecutor,
be kept of the testimony introduced before the grand jury
in all criminal causes where an indictment is returned. In
the case of In re Kennedy, 144 Cal. 634 [78 Pac. 34, 103 Am.
St. Rep. 117, 1 Ann. Cas. 840, 67 L. R. A. 406], a defendant
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, which constituted the evidence presented to the grand jury, was insufficient to justify an indictment. The court properly refused
the writ, holding, in accordance with the general rule, that
it would not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence.
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Brobeck v. Superior Court, 152 Cal. 289 [92 Pac. 646], in
holding that a writ of prohibition did not lie to restrain a
trial court from proceeding upon an indictment where there
was no evidence presented to the grand jury to support the
charges, relied solely upon the authority of In re Kennedy
without noting the difference between the two cases. At the
time each case was decided, section 925 of the Penal Code
merely permitted the district attorney at his discretion to
have testimony before the grand jury reported but did not
make such reporting mandatory. The cases therefore do not
control the present situation and the views expressed therein
'
inconsistent with this opinion are disapproved.
Petitioner cannot appeal either from the order denying his
motion to quash· the indictment or from the overruling of
his demurrer. He could not be required to stand trial and
to appeal from a possible adverse jUdgment without being
subjected to unreasonable expense, inconvenience, and delay.
(Bruner V. Superior Court, 92 Cal. 239 [28 Pac. 341] ; Terrill
V. Superior Court, 6 Cal. Unrep. 398 [60 Pac. 38J; Evans v.
Willis, 22 Okla. 310 [97 Pac. 1047, 18 Ann. Cas. 258,
19 L. R. A. (NS) 1050]; see Farraher v. Superior Court,
45 Cal. App. 4 [187 Pac. 72].) The only adequate remedy
he may seek, therefore, is a writ of prohibition (Ibid.).
Regardless of the fact that the grand jury is a judicial tribunal from whose decisions there is no appeal (In re Kennedy, supra), defendant has the statutory right to restrain
the· court by prohibition from proceeding in excess of its
jurisdiction to try an offense based on a void indictment.
Petitioner is therefore entitled to a peremptory writ of prohibition restraining the respondent court from proceeding with
the trial.
Let a writ of prohibition issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., and
Carter, J., concurred.

